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HE bankruptcy of Enron Corporation in November 2001 has
raised serious questions about the efficacy of corporate govern-
ance. The actual causes of the largest bankruptcy in the history of
the United States may not be known until all of the facts have been deter-
mined, but from appearances it seems that corporate governance failed
completely. It is unsettling to realize that the basic principles of fiduciary
obligation established over many years could be taken so lightly and dis-
carded so easily.' Corporate governance is about adherence to the princi-
ples of fair play and the recognition of what it means to act responsibly,
not only for the shareholders and employees but also for other corporate
constituencies. It is not about taking advantage of positions of trust but
of following a course of conduct that meets a standard higher than the
minimum standard required when, considered in the light of experience
and common sense, that higher course is the obvious course to take. In
its broadest sense corporate governance touches practically every aspect
of corporate existence, and is influenced by a variety of laws, rules, regu-
lations, court decisions, policies, and practices. State corporate statutes
are the keystone, since they provide the framework for derivative suits
and other shareholder rights as well as management and board responsi-
bilities.2 Federal and state laws, such as the antitrust laws, securities laws,
and environmental laws, give direction for management and the board of
directors in specific areas of corporate operation and policy. The listing
requirements and policies of the New York Stock Exchange and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Quotation System (NASDAQ),
1. For articles on corporate governance, see Michael D. Goldman & Eileen M. Fil-
leben, Corporate Governance: Current Trends and Likely Developments for the
Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683 (2000); Claire Moore Dickerson,
Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual Organization and Conflicting Governance
Vectors, 59 U. Prr. L. REV. 759 (1998); Corporate Governance Symposium, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 27 (1998); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding
Seamlessly Into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417 (1996); Victor Brud-
ney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Introduction to Warren
Buffet Symposium Papers, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719 (1997); E. C. Lashbrook, The
Divergence of Corporate Finance and Law in Corporate Governance, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 449 (1995).
2. See Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholders' Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
215 (1999).
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as well as the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the account-
ing profession, also play a role as do decisions of federal and state courts
and the policies of governmental agencies. The agency that has had the
most influence on corporate governance is the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) 3 which oversees the issuance of securities and regula-
tion of the securities markets. Pronouncements by the SEC, formal or
informal, 4 are closely monitored by corporations whose shares are pub-
licly-traded.
While the scope of corporate governance can be all-encompassing, 5 its
focus in recent years has centered on boards of directors and audit com-
mittees. 6 That focus has resulted in a continuing examination of the rela-
tionships among management, the board of directors, and the
shareholders with the creation of shareholder value within the framework
of responsible corporate citizenship being a primary concern of manage-
ment and the board. 7 With respect to corporate citizenship, corporations
are permitted to use corporate assets in reasonable amounts for social
purposes,8 but business corporations are commercial enterprises and
shareholder value must be given prominence. 9 The well-known treatise,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a0 published in 1932, was
influential not only in the enactment of the federal securities laws but
also on shareholder rights.' As to what shareholders were entitled to
expect, the authors stated that:
The corporate stockholder has certain well-defined interests in the
operation of the company, in the distribution of income and in the
public security markets. In general, it is to his interest, first that the
company should be made to earn the maximum profit compatible
3. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance Oversight Responsi-
bility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2001).
4. See, e.g., text of speech by Lynn E. Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, Audit Commit-
tees: A Call to Action (Oct. 5, 2000) (available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/othern/
spch4l4htm).
5. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance,
48 Bus. LAW. 1271 (1993).
6. See SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, COMMI'TEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE 96TH CONGRESS, (Comm.
Print 1980) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report]; Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the
Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, 54 Bus. LAW. 1057
(1999); Lashbrook, supra note 2, at 455-62 (1999).
7. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 129 (1999); A. A. Sommer, Jr., A Comment on Dunfee, 62
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 159 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy
Norm, 23 J. CORP L. 277 (1998); Paul H. Zalecki, The Corporate Governance Roles
of Inside and Outside Directors, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 831, 833 (1993).
8. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN., art. 2.02(A)(14) (Vernon 2001); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001); see R. Frank Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., A Reap-
praisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus. LAW. 965 (1999).
9. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see Lashbrooksupra note 2,
at 455.
10. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 1948) (1932)).
11. See Donald E. Swartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L. J.
545, fn. 6 (1984).
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with a reasonable degree of risk; second, that as large a proportion of
these profits should be distributed as the best interests of the busi-
ness permit, and that nothing should happen to impair his right to
receive his equitable share of those profits which are distributed; and
finally, that his stock should remain freely marketable at a fair
price. 12
The corporate governance-related statutes, rules, regulations, and court
decisions often contain provisions or guidelines placing restraints on cor-
porate action, but the relationship between shareholders and the board of
directors is characterized by the latitude allowed to the board through
application of the business judgment rule.13 The business judgment rule,
as applied under Delaware corporate law, was expressed by the Delaware
Supreme Court in a 1985 decision when the court wrote:
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of
the fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the
business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or
under its board of directors . . . In carrying out their managerial
roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders ... The business judgment rule ex-
ists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the manage-
rial power granted to Delaware directors . . . The rule itself "is a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the hon-
est belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com-
pany.."... Thus, the party attacking a board decision as uninformed
must rebut the presumption that its business judgment was an in-
formed one. 14
A review of significant developments in corporate regulation and cor-
porate governance in the United States from the latter part of the nine-
teenth century to the present may be useful in gaining a perspective in the
aftermath of Enron. It should be recognized that the term corporate gov-
ernance has had widespread usage only during the recent past, which re-
quires that developments involving corporate regulation also be included
in the review.
One of the more unworthy periods in American business history oc-
curred during the years following the end of the Civil War. Business ac-
tivity was increasing and new technologies and energy sources were being
introduced to improve efficiencies in production. A cross-country rail
system was under construction and communications were changing radi-
cally through the telephone and telegraph. 15 But it was during these
years that monopolistic and discriminatory practices became widespread
12. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 11, at 121.
13. See R. Frank Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule,
48 Bus. LAW. 133 (1993).
14. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
15. See JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION (2d
2000); DANIEL J.GIFFORD & LEO J. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS (1998).
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through the concentration of commercial enterprises in business trusts,
pools, and other types of collusive arrangements.1 6 The activities of these
enterprises, particularly the trusts, were vilified by the Congress of the
United States and the general public for price-fixing and other flagrant
business practices. 17 After two years of debate in Congress, the Sherman
Act was signed into law in 1890 to proscribe monopolistic activities and
agreements in restraint of trade. 18 There were no concerted efforts at
enforcement of the Sherman Act, however, until the administration of
President Theodore Roosevelt which began in 1901. The Clayton Act 9
was enacted in 1914 to improve the Sherman Act, and the Robinson-Pat-
man Act 20 was added in 1936 to deal with unfair pricing.
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 2 1 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 22 were reactions by the administra-
tion of President Franklin Roosevelt and Congress to wild speculation
and fraudulent activity in the securities markets in the 1920s. 23 These
statutes and subsequent amendments, along with the rules, regulations,
investigations, and enforcement actions of the SEC, have had a profound
effect on corporate activity in the securities markets.
According to commentators, a culture of inattention to responsibilities
was pervasive among boards of directors prior to the late 1960s and early
1970s.2 4 Change began during those periods, particularly during the
1970s, as the oversight duties of boards of directors and the behavior of
management in conducting business operations increasingly were the sub-
jects of legislative action, court decisions, and SEC investigations. 25 In
1968, the ruling of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York on motions to dismiss in Escott v. Barchris Construction
Corp.,2 6 a case brought under the Securities Act of 1933 for registration
statement liability, attracted widespread attention. Although not a cor-
porate governance case in the strict sense, it was among the first publi-
cized cases to highlight the liability of directors for a misleading
registration statement. Barchris Construction Corp. was engaged in the
construction of bowling alleys and for a few years enjoyed substantial
success. However, as the popularity of bowling declined in the early
16. See 1 Earl W. Kinter, Sherman Act of 1890, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 3, (Earl W. Kinter ed.,
1978); 2 JOSEPH J. NORTON, REGULATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN THE
U.S.A. (1985).
17. Id.; see supra note 16.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18, et seq.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 13, et seq.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq.
23. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
24. See Millstein, supra note 7, fn. 11 (citations omitted).
25. See Brown, supra note 4, at 51-63, for an account of significant SEC investigations
during the 1970s.
26. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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1960s, the demand for new bowling alley construction also declined and
the fortunes of the company suffered. During that period of decline the
company sold debentures to the public under a registration statement
filed with the SEC. Seventeen months later, the company filed for bank-
ruptcy and the debentures became worthless. A lawsuit was then brought
by the investors against the company, the directors, the underwriters, and
the auditors alleging that the registration statement contained false and
misleading information about the company and omitted information nec-
essary to inform an investor of its true condition. In the findings of fact
as determined by the court in the hearing on the motions to dismiss,
which, under the court's ruling were binding in any further proceedings,
the court found that the directors were not fully informed about company
operations and had not fulfilled the due diligence standard of investiga-
tion required to avoid liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933.27
The publicity surrounding the Barchris case was a forerunner of the
publicity attendant to the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Transportation
Company2 8 in 1970 which at that time was one of the largest corporations
in the United States. The relationship between the financial collapse of
Penn Central and the federal securities laws was at the center of an inves-
tigation by the SEC that also looked closely at the actions of the board of
directors.29 Although the SEC only has power over directors who are in
violation of the securities laws, 30 SEC investigations that touch on issues
such as breach of fiduciary duty provide encouragement to private liti-
gants and are believed to have a deterrent effect.
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central Rail-
road Company merged in 1967 with the name of the surviving company
being changed to The Penn Central Company. In 1970, after only three
years of operation, Penn Central filed for bankruptcy.3 1 The SEC de-
cided to investigate the causes of the financial collapse of Penn Central to
determine the relationship between the company's demise and the fed-
eral securities laws. The investigation resulted in a Report, issued in 1972
(Penn Central Report), 32 that found the outside directors had failed in
the performance of their duties as directors. According to the Director of
the Enforcement Division of the SEC, the Penn Central investigation re-
sulted in a turning point in SEC policy. He wrote the following in a law
review article:
... I always like to think that one ofthe turning points in agency
policy occurred when the Commission investigated the Penn Central
Corporation . . . As we looked into Penn Central we decided not
27. See 15 U.S.C § 77a, et seq.
28. In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 385 F. Supp. 612 (E. D. Penn. 1974).
29. See SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Company,
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder]Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,931.
30. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 78a, et seq.
31. Penn Central, 385 F.Supp. at 612.
32. Staff Report, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 78,931.
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only to investigate the financial debacle, but also to look at the vari-
ous components to determine what role management had played. We
particularly focused on the directors in that case, and in the staff re-
port we issued, the staff found that the directors were generally ac-
customed to playing an inactive role in company affairs, permitted
management to operate without any effective review or control, and
remained uninformed throughout the period of important develop-
ments and activities. 33
In 1976, the Special Prosecutor in the Watergate Hearings testified
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on
his investigation into the Nixon Administration's role in illegal political
campaign activities. He stated that there was also evidence of illegal cor-
porate payments. 34 During the investigation, the testimony of corporate
officers in the investigation of the existence of corporate "slush funds"
that were not reflected in the company's financial records attracted the
attention of the SEC because they were required under the securities
laws to be in their financial statements. 35 Further hearings produced evi-
dence of payments by a large number of corporations to foreign govern-
ment officials, politicians, and political parties to influence the awarding
of contracts and for other purposes. 36 As a result of the hearings, Con-
gress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)37 in 1977 to put
an end to these practices. The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by requiring that public companies keep books in reasonable
detail to reflect transactions and dispositions of assets and by maintaining
internal controls so there would be accountability for assets and transac-
tions.38 The FCPA is an example of corporate governance by legislative
fiat, although brought on by unconscionable corporate behavior.39 In the
aftermath of Enron, a similar approach can be expected.
During the late 1970s the SEC began to examine its rules relating to
shareholder communications, shareholder participation in the corporate
33. See Stanley Sporkin, SEC Enforcement and the Corporate Boardroom, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 455, at 455 (1983).
34. See Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133, Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th. Congress, 2d. Sess. 3 (1976).
35. See Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INTL'L L. &
COM. 235 (1982).
36. See Legislative History of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, House of Represent-
atives Report to accompany H.R. 3815 (Sept. 28, 1977); Report of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development to accompany S-305
(Mar. 28, 1977), Senate Report No. 95-114; SEC Report on Questionable and Ille-
gal Corporate Payments and Practices (1976), referred to as the "May 12 Report,"
Sec. and Exch. Comm, 94th Congress, 2nd. Session.
37. Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5001-5423, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-69 (1988) (amending 15
U.S.C. Par. 78a-78dd).
38. Id.
39. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and
Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977); Kenneth J. Bialkin, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Regulation of Questionable Payments, 34 Bus
LAW. 623 (1979); Mary Jane Dundas & Barbara C. George, Historical Analysis of
the Accounting Standards of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 MEMPHIS ST. L.
REV. 499 (1980).
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electoral process, and corporate governance generally. A task force was
formally established in 1979, and in September 1980 a Staff Report on
Corporate Accountability (1980 Report) 40 was sent to the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate in support of
changes in the securities laws advocated by the SEC. In a Forward to the
1980 Report, Senator Williams, Chairman of the Committee, wrote that:
"... a new consensus is emerging with respect to the vital monitoring role
to be played by the board of directors in the corporate accountability
process and the most desirable and appropriate composition and struc-
ture of a board designed to play such an enhanced oversight role. ' '4 1 With
respect to corporate governance, the 1980 Report stated that a board of
directors having a majority of independent directors was essential to cor-
porate accountability and that each board should have effectively func-
tioning audit, compensation, and nominating committees independent of
management. 42 The 1980 Report alsq made recommendations with re-
spect to the functions of audit committees. 43
During 1978, the year following formation of the SEC task force on
corporate accountability that resulted in the 1980 Report, the American
Law Institute (ALI) initiated a project on corporate governance (ALI
Project). 44 The ALI was organized in 1923 by a group of lawyers, law
professors, and judges, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States. 45 The charter of the ALI stated that it would "en-
courage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work."' 46 The principle
projects of the ALI have been restatements of basic legal subjects, in-
cluding the law of contracts, torts, agency, conflict of laws, and many
others. 47 The chief reporter for the ALI Project wrote that the project
was not initiated because of the events that had occurred during the
1970s, but that the idea for a project on corporate governance had
originated in 1923. However, after preliminary drafts of a Restatement of
the Law of Business Associations, it was determined that the subject mat-
ter was not suitable for restatement form.48 The ALI Project was a re-
newal of the original effort in 1923.49
The ALI Project resulted in the publication in 1992 of the Principles of
40. SEC Staff Report, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 2.
42. For a study on the relationship between corporate performance and the makeup of
the board of directors, see Sanjai Bhagat Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relation-
ship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999).
43. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 7.
44. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1271; Richard B. Smith, An Underview of the Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1297 (1993); Michael P. Dooley,
Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461(1992).




48. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1271.
49. See id.
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Corporate Governance (Principles). 50 The ALl limited its considerations
to the basic ground rules applicable to the fiduciary responsibilities of
directors and officers and did not include corporate finance, internal
meetings of shareholders, and other such matters.5' The Principles gener-
ated controversy among those who participated in the ALI Project and in
the commentary that followed publication.52 In part, that criticism re-
volved around the process that was followed during the project 53 but
other criticism dealt with provisions contained in the Principles. 54 The
Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association (Section)
neither endorsed nor opposed the Principles for the reason that the Sec-
tion did not believe that the Principles were harmonized sufficiently with
the Model Business Corporation Act.55 The controversy surrounding the
ALI Project may have resulted from a systemic problem inherent in at-
tempting to codify the concept of corporate governance, which draws
from a number of legal and non-legal sources that can change with chang-
ing business practices and economic conditions.
During the period in which the ALI Project was under consideration,
state and federal courts decided a number of cases involving unsolicited
tender offers.56 These offers raise a basic corporate governance issue.
The shareholders of the target corporation are offered a premium over
the market value for their shares, and the issue is whether the sharehold-
ers are entitled to make the decision to sell their shares and receive that
premium. In many instances, target corporations are able to defeat the
offer through corporate defensive tactics thereby making the premium
unavailable to shareholders. 57 As Delaware is a favored state for incorpo-
ration, many of the leading cases were decided in Delaware courts apply-
ing Delaware corporate law.58
A debate developed during the early 1980s around the role of directors
in unsolicited tender offers. It was argued by those advocating director
neutrality that successful resistance by the company would deprive the
50. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994).
51. See Roswell B. Perkins, Thanks, Myth and Reality, 48 Bus. LAw. 1313 (1993).
52. See Alex Etson & Michael L. Shakman, ALl Principles of Corporate Governance:
A Tainted Process and a Flawed Project, 49 Bus. LAw. 1761 (1994).
53. Id.
54. See Zalecki, supra note 8, at 835.
55. See E. Norman Veasey, The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Pro-
ject, The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline, 48 Bus.
LAw. 1267 (1993); Elliott Goldstein, The Relationship Between the Model Business
Corporation Act and the Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501 (1984).
56. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Treco,
Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
302 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Revlon, Inc. Pantry Pride, Inc.,
612 F.Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1985); Martin Marrieta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. 549 F.
Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Uncoal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
57. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
58. See Unocal, 493 A.2d 946; Revlon, 621 F.Supp. 804.
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shareholders of the opportunity to receive the premium offered for their
shares in the tender offer.5 9 The other view was that directors should
take an active role to defeat offers in which the price offered was thought
to be inadequate or not in the best interests of the corporation. 60 In 1985,
the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a board of directors could re-
sist an unsolicited tender offer under a modified version of the business
judgment rule in which the burden of proof shifts to the board, provided
that: (i) there were reasonable grounds for believing the offer repre-
sented a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, and (ii) the resis-
tance offered was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 6 1 In
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware Supreme
Court addressed the issue in terms of corporate governance with the fol-
lowing statement:
Paramount argues that, assuming its tender offer posed a threat, Time's
response was unreasonable in precluding Time's shareholders from ac-
cepting the tender offer or receiving a control premium in the immedi-
ately foreseeable future. Once again, the contention stems, we believe,
from a fundamental misunderstanding of where the power of corporate
governance lies.
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to
the stockholders' duly elected board representatives . . . The fiduciary
duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time
frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be dele-
gated to the stockholders . . . Directors are not obligated to abandon a
deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit
unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
62
In 1996, the decision of the Delaware Chancery Court in a case involv-
ing illegal corporate payments to doctors by a patient and managed care
provider reverberated through corporate boardrooms because of its cor-
porate governance implications. In re Caremark International, Inc. De-
rivative Litigation 63 considered the question of director responsibility for
the corporation's violation of a federal law prohibiting payments to in-
duce referral of Medicare/Medicaid patients. In August 1994, a federal
grand jury indicted Caremark, two of its officers, and an employee of
another corporation for having made payments of more than $1.1 million
to a Minneapolis doctor to induce sales of a growth hormone distributed
59. See Franklin H. Esterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics
and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Franklin H. Esterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of the Target's Management, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981); Franklin H. Esterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Target's Gain From
Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984).
60. See Leo Herzel et al., Why Corporate Directors Have the Right to Resist Tender
Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980); Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein,
Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities - An Update, 40 Bus. LAW.
1403 (1985).
61. Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
62. 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
63. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see Brown, supra note 4, at 6-9.
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by Caremark. The payments were made under the guise of consulting
agreements and research grants for which the doctor performed no ser-
vices. One month later the grand jury returned other indictments for
payments to a doctor in Ohio.
Caremark subsequently settled with the U.S. Justice Department and
various state agencies by paying $29 million in criminal fines and $3.5
million for violation of the Controlled Substance Act. It also paid $129
million to settle shareholder class action suits and contributed $2 million
to AIDS research. A derivative suit was filed against the directors alleg-
ing breach of the duty of care for failing to monitor and adequately super-
vise the affairs of the corporation. In approving settlement of the suit,
the judge determined that there was no support for the allegations that
the directors had actual knowledge of the violations of law by Caremark
or that they had failed to monitor and supervise the activities of the
corporation.
The Caremark case attracted attention because of the potential for in-
creased director liability. One commentator believes the Caremark deci-
sion does not represent a significant source of director liability, since a
board of directors can easily devise compliance programs that will be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule. 64 However, the commentator also
realizes the decision will cause corporate directors to "implement protec-
tions that go beyond what is required by law" to limit corporate
liability.65
As stated at the outset of this paper, corporate governance in the
United States has focused in recent years on boards of directors and audit
committees. In 1977, at the urging of the SEC, the New York Stock Ex-
change included a requirement in its listing application that the board of
directors of a listed company have an audit committee. 66 That require-
ment was later adopted by NASDAQ. 67 The Blue Ribbon Committee
issued a report "On Improving Effectiveness of Audit Committees"
("Blue Ribbon Report") in 199868 which the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ sponsored with the encouragement of the SEC. The Blue
Ribbon Report contained ten recommendations for enhancement of au-
dit committee performance and five guiding principles for audit commit-
tee best practices.6 9 The recommendations emphasized independence
64. Stephen F. Funk, In Re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation: Director
Behavior, Shareholder Protection, and Corporate Legal Compliance, 22 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 311, 323 (1997).
65. See id. at 321-23. See also, CAROL L. BASRI ET AL., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE:
Caremark and the Globalization of Good Corporate Conduct, COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES (No. B-1057) (1998).
66. In re New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Exchange Act Release No. 13,346 (Mar. 9,
1977); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, available at
http://www.nyse.com/listed.
67. Allen I. Young, Internal Control Systems and the Independent Accountant, 835 PLI/
Corp. 503, 671 (1994).
68. See Millstein, supra note 7, at 1057-58.
69. Id. at 1063.
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and financial literacy of audit committee members, as well as quality of
financial information.70
The recommendations were directed to the SEC, the New York Stock
Exchange, NASDAQ, and the accounting standards under Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles.7 ' The SEC adopted the recommendations
addressed to it and made those recommendations effective for registered
companies as of January 31, 2000.72 The New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ adopted the recommendations by amending their listing
requirements. 73
The duties and responsibilities of boards of directors have been the
subject of numerous court decisions, treatises, and legal articles over the
years.7 4 In comparison, court decisions and legal literature concerning au-
dit committees are a more recent development so such material is rela-
tively sparse. 75 Audit committees now comprise a prominent role in
corporate governance, and their responsibilities and the consequences of
thier failing to carry out those responsibilities have become increasingly
important.
Few reported cases involve audit committees, and those that have been
reported were brought in federal courts and deal only with motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 76 The defendants in all of
these cases included the corporation, senior corporate officers, members
of the audit committee of the board of directors and other members of
the board, the independent auditors, and in some cases financial advisors.
The cases generally revolved around alleged misrepresentations of finan-
cial information actionable under Section 10 and other sections of the
Exchange Act, as well as breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders under
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See http:ll/ NYSE Rule Making: Order Apporving Proposed Rule Change Amend-
ing the Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. 1 and No. 2 Thereto, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-42233 (Dec. 14, 1999).
73. See Thomas Gilroy, Disclosures Regarding Audit Committees, 1285 PLI/Corp. 275,
279 (2002).
74. See, e.g, Ira M. Millstein & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283
(1998); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89
GEO. L. J. 797 (2001); Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 Bus. LAW. 1427
(Aug. 1995); Ira M. Millstein, The Responsible Board, 52 Bus LAW. 407 (1997).
75. See John F. Olson, How to Really Make Audit Committees More Effective, 54 Bus.
LAW. 1097 (1999); Kevin lurato, Comment, Warning! A Position On the Audit
Committee Could Mean Greater Exposure to Liability: The Problems With Apply-
ing a Heightened Standard of Care to the Corporate Audit Committee, 30 STET. L.
REV. 977 (2000); Millstein, supra note 7, at 1057-58.
76. See In re JWP, Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tischler v. Balti-
more Bancorp, 801 F. Supp. 1493 (D.C. Md. 1992); Greenfield v. Prof. Care Inc.,
677 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); In re AM Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Haltman v. Aura Sys. Inc., 844 F. Supp. 544 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
Bomarko, Inc. v. Hemodynomics, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1335 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
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state law. In several of the cases the allegations also included alleged
violation of various sections of the Securities Act.
In re Reliance Securities Litigation, 77 the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware issued separate rulings on (1) motions to
dismiss and (2) motions for summary judgment. These two rulings dealt
with allegations against members of the board of directors for failing to
perform their duties in their capacities as directors and as members of
either the audit committee or the financial oversight committee. The case
involves the failure of a finance company that was primarily engaged in
making sub-prime automobile loans.
In April 2000, the court denied the motions to dismiss filed by the
outside directors, 78 who each belonged to the audit committee or the fi-
nancial oversight committee. The complaint contained five counts:79
Count I alleges that the defendants knowingly or recklessly made public
statements containing material misrepresentations regarding the financial
condition of the company in SEC filings and press releases in violation of
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5; Count II alleges the
making of such misrepresentations in a proxy statement in violation of
Section 14a-9 of the Exchange Act; Count III alleges that the defendants
are vicariously liable for violations of the securities laws by persons they
controlled; Count IV alleges that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties under Delaware law by failing to disclose material facts in a proxy
statement necessary for shareholders to make informed investment deci-
sions; and Count V relates to breach of fiduciary duty for self-dealing in
an ERISA matter.
The court first considered the motions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims
under Rule 10b-5. To prevail on the merits after a trial, the court stated
that the plaintiffs must show that: "(i) defendants made a misstatement or
omission; (ii) of a material fact; (iii) with scienter; (iv) in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities; (v) upon which plaintiffs relied; and (vi)
that reliance proximately caused plaintiffs' losses." 80 The court then
stated that the first, third, and sixth prongs of this analysis were at issue.
With respect to the first prong, a misstatement or omission, the mem-
bers of the audit committee argued the plaintiffs only alleged they signed
or helped prepare SEC filings possibly containing misstatements or omis-
sions but that such activity does not amount to the actual making of a
misstatement or omission.81In response, the plaintiffs argued outside di-
rectors may be liable for signing or aiding in the preparation of false or
misleading financial disclosure, particularly when the directors served on
77. In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F.Supp.2d 706 (D. Del. 2000) (motion to dismiss); In
re Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F.Supp.2d 480 (D. Del. 2001) (motion for summary
judgment).
78. See In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F.Supp.2d at 717-18.
79. Id. at 717.
80. Id. at 720.
81. Id.
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committees responsible for the company's financial oversight.82 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants prepared, approved, or reviewed fi-
nancial statements containing material overstatements to the company's
net income as a result of inadequate reserves. 83 In denying the motions
to dismiss, the court said that, while no specific misstatement could be
attributable to the defendants, the wrong complained of involved declin-
ing loan loss reserves as actual loan loss rates increased and that such
matters were of the kind that the defendants may have had oversight re-
sponsibility. Therefore, plaintiffs should have the opportunity to conduct
discovery to determine whether misrepresentations occurred.84 With re-
spect to the scienter requirement, the court found the plaintiffs may not
ascribe knowledge of the company's financial problems to the defendants
solely because of their committee positions.85 However, under the facts as
alleged, the defendants possibly knew the net income was overstated and
the loan portfolio was deteriorating, sufficiently proving the recklessness
and thus scienter.86
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment87 after their mo-
tions to dismiss were denied, arguing that they were outside directors and
should not be liable for simply signing documents filed with the SEC.
The defendants further argued that the plaintiffs must prove that they
had day-to-day operational involvement. The court denied the motions
for summary judgment, rejecting these arguments, and quoted from How-
ard v. Everex Sys., Inc.:" [kjey corporate officers should not be allowed to
make important false financial statements knowingly or recklessly, yet
shield themselves from liability to investors simply by failing to be in-
volved in the preparation of those statements. '88
The court then found the Howard rationale applies to the defendants,
because the evidence indicates that they had ample opportunity to review
the documents and that, although they might not be involved in prepara-
tion of the documents, their signing could constitute the making of mis-
leading statements.8 9 The court also found the evidence satisfied the
scienter requirement for the purposes of the motions for summary judg-
ment because the defendants may have acted recklessly by ignoring ex-
press warnings of the company's financial trouble.90
The conclusions that can be drawn from the two rulings of the Dela-
ware Federal District Court discussed above and the other reported rul-
ings involving motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment are
that audit committee members: (i) must have fundamental financial liter-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 721.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 724.
86. Id. at 722.
87. In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F.Supp.2d 480 (D. Del. 2001).
88. Id. at 503 (quoting Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d at 1062).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 508.
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acy; (ii) must be diligent in their review of the company's financial state-
ments and other financial information; (iii) must be prepared to require
that such information be furnished as deemed necessary; (iv) must be
alert for warning signs of impending financial difficulties; and (v) must be
prepared to act in response to those warning signs. These conclusions
form only a part of the responsibilities of audit committee members, but
failing to pay heed will only increase their vulnerability.
In October 2000, the then Chief Accountant of the SEC, in a speech
given in New York City, stated that quality financial information is crucial
to the integrity of the capital markets and that audit committees are
uniquely positioned to oversee corporate accounting and financial sys-
tems.9' The fact that quality financial information is essential to the in-
tegrity of the capital markets necessarily means that shareholder value, a
primary goal of corporate governance, is directly related to the market
price of a corporation's shares. That is not to say that market price is the
only measure of shareholder value or that a well-functioning audit com-
mittee contributes most of what is needed for good corporate govern-
ance, but market price is a highly visible indicator. Shareholder value may
not be reflected in the market price of shares for a variety of reasons.
Plus virtually all areas within the corporate structure, in addition to the
audit committee, are involved in corporate governance.
Corporate governance in the United States has developed over many
years through laws, court decisions, regulations, policies, best practices,
and the other influences described in this paper. As we have seen, reper-
cussions from questionable corporate behavior, periods of economic dis-
tress, and corporate failures have been the principal catalysts for change
in these influences. Those aspects of corporate governance lacking more
specific definition are generally found in the fluid relationships among
managers, directors, shareholders, and other corporate stakeholders, aris-
ing from the complexities of day-to-day business operations. These as-
pects must be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. As one corporate
commentator remarked:
Effective corporate governance remains more an art than a science,
and a mysterious art at that. We are certain that it can increase share-
holder value, but can find little statistical evidence to prove it. Good
governance procedures are vital for boards, yet it is impossible to
define any 'best practice' governance template. 92
Although corporate governance may be an art as suggested by the
above quotation, there is an essential ingredient without which it will fail.
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey referred to
this ingredient in a 1996 speech on corporate governance given in Austra-
lia: "In the end, the issue is integrity. Corporate governance depends on
91. Id.
92. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, THE MYSTERIOUS ART OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE
CORPORATE BOARD (2001).
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the integrity of the directors and their counselors. '93 This dependence on
integrity may be the lesson learned from Enron. Notwithstanding the le-
gal fences erected around corporate behavior, in the end, as Judge Veasey
said, it is integrity that counts.
93. E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tensions in Corporate Governance in America,
52 Bus. LAw. 393 (1997).
2003]
20 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
